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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN FLORIDA*
TULLY

ScoTr and

GROVER

C.

HERRING**

A leading text has stated, "As a general rule, malpractice suits are
based on negligence, and do not differ in their essential ingredients
from any other action for damages arising from negligence."' I
Many a trial lawyer, assuming this statement to be true, has stood
in dazed bewilderment in an emptying courtroom with the remains
of a hopefully successful medical malpractice case lying in flinders
at his feet. He has learned the hard way that there are differences
between "the essential ingredients" of a malpractice suit and an ordinary negligence action. These differences have operated generally to
make recovery much less likely in a case of medical negligence.2 For
this reason, when the typical malpractice case walks into a lawyer's
office, the lawyer usually listens to the patient's tale of woe, exudes
boundless sympathy, and then refuses the case. The lawyer may not
know the specific problems facing him in a malpractice action. But
he does know that, even when sheer butchery is evident, he may lose

the case, disappoint his client, alienate the medical profession, and
make no profit.
The purpose of this discussion is not to instruct the lawyer on
how to win a malpractice case. Rather it is to explore and illustrate
the differences between ordinary and medical negligence, and to discuss the effect of the recent case of Atkins v. Humes3 as a step in the

*The authors acknowledge their indebtedness to Stanley Gray, investigator for
counsel, West Palm Beach, Florida, for his invaluable services in the study of trial
court records, consultation on text and appendix, and work on the footnotes.
"Tully Scott,,A.B. 1949, Amherst College; LL.B. 1953, Harvard University; Member of West Palm Beach, Florida, Bar.
Grover C. Herring, LL.B. 1950, University of Florida; Member of West Palm
Beach, Florida, Bar.
370 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons §48, at 955.
2See Appendix infra for tables giving Florida appellate cases and results in 96
concluded cases in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties.
3110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959). This is a landmark decision written by Roberts, J.,

[121]
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recall of medical negligence from the special legal niche it has occupied for so long.4
STANDARD OF CARE

The doctor-patient relation is one of mutual trust and confidence,
and on both sides the "utmost good faith must be exercised." 5 The
patient is weak and ignorant. The doctor is wise and in control. His
duty should be great. But this does not mean that idealism has played
any part in the legal standard of care required of him.
In an ordinary negligence action, the standard of care of the reasonable man is determined by law, upon the facts of the case as found
by the jury. Yet in medical negligence cases the standard has been
set, with but few exceptions, by one or more local doctors as expert
witness, testifying in that particularcase. Neither medical science nor
nationally known authorities have been called upon. The defendant's
local colleagues, and not the law, have fixed the standard of care. In
this quasi-judicial role, they have been allowed the widest latitude.
They have testified in every instance not as to the best practice but as
to the local practice.
Although lip service has been paid to the rule that "Custom does
not excuse what is inherently negligent,"6 few courts have applied it
to doctors. In Connecticut it has been held that branding an act "bad
practice" does not make it negligent, so long as it conforms to "standard practice." 7 Some very odd conduct, as a layman would judge it,
has often been declared "standard practice."
In Grubbs v. McShane8 the plaintiff had a swelling in the leg,
which the defendant doctor elected to treat with heat. He told the
plaintiff's family to build a device of barrel staves and light bulbs over
the affected leg to provide heat. The device raised a blister and the
with Terrell, C. J., and Drew, Thornal and O'Connell, JJ., concurring. There was
no dissent.
4Unauthorized treatment or trespass, hospitals, dentists, and liability for third
parties are excluded from this discussion. See Appendix infra, Table I, for several
cases that are omitted from consideration herein. See also Comment, 12 U. MIAMI
L. R v.259 (1958).
570 C.J.S., Physicians and Surgeons §36, at 941.
GAtlantic C.L.R.R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933); Dorris v. Warlord,
124 Ky. 768, 100 S.W. 312 (1907).
?Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 111 A.2d 675 (1955).
8144 Fla. 585, 198 So. 208 (1940).
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plaintiff complained, asking that it be removed. He was told that
the treatment must continue, although smaller bulbs were substituted.
The apparatus was left-in place for eighteen days; the blister burst,
and the leg became ulcerated. No thermometer was ever used to
measure the heat that was applied.
Everyone knows that light bulbs can burn. One would think
that the doctor should have inspected this dangerous-appearing contraption before allowing it to be used. But the jury was not permitted
to determine this. After one doctor had testified that it was customary to advise the use of a device such as was employed by the defendant, and to go away and leave it to a layman to follow the instructions given, a verdict was directed for the defendant. The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the proper remedy was used
properly.
In Dohr v. Smithg a medically simple case, an anesthetist dislodged
two false teeth during an operation. The teeth were found weeks
later in the patient's windpipe. The anesthetist knew that she had
made a mistake. At the conclusion of the operation, and again on
the following day, she confided her worry to the surgeon. The patient
shortly developed a cough. No X rays were taken. When the patient's
husband requested that search be made by X rays, the surgeon answered, "I wouldn't worry about it. That cough will go away."
Weeks after the operation, the surgeon finally advised X rays to discover the reason for the patient's persistent cough, and the missing
teeth were discovered.
The facts, and the question of the surgeon's negligence, would
appear well within the experience of all men. The appellate court
affirmed the verdict for the defendant surgeon because of "the dearth
of expert testimony about what other surgeons in the community
would have done in the circumstances."' 1 Surely the doctor's duty,
in view of his patient's trust and faith, was to make immediate investigation upon the anesthetist's report. Yet, under the law, only his
fellow doctors were deemed competent to set the standard of care
that a defendant doctor must observe.
The general rule has always been that a doctor's standard of care
must be measured by the rules of the school to which he belongs."
9104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958).
olod. at 33.
1141 AM. JuR., Physicians and Surgeons §85, at 203; 70 C.J.S., Phy6icians and
Surgeons §44, at 952.
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This requirement has meant little in Florida. If medical treatment
meets the standard of skill and care of even a "respectable minority
of the medical profession," it is enough. For example, the Supreme
Court has held that a doctor can use the Koch treatment (injections
of glyoxylide) for cancer. 12 It has also held that any doctor may
testify as to the standard of care in diagnosis, or on any "point as to
which the principles of the schools do or should concur, such as the
dangers incident to the use of X rays or the existence of a condition
13
that should be recognized by any physician."'
A specialist is any doctor who holds himself out as such. Theoretically, he should be held to a higher standard of skill, care, and
learning than that of the general practitioner. 1 4 But, again, his
standard is found to be whatever his fellow specialists say it is. A
pregnant girl developed complications and was told by a general
physician that a Caesarian section might be needed. She subsequently
sought a specialist, who, after two examinations, told her she was not
pregnant. Two months later she had a miscarriage. The appellate
court, affirming summary judgment for the defendant specialist,
pointed out that one expert's affidavit "reflects that the defendant
followed accepted means and methods . . . in arriving at the chal-

lenged diagnosis," and that the plaintiff's affidavit did not show
negligence.'5
The traditional rule that the standard of care to be applied is a
local one1 6 has, until recently, been adhered to in Florida. "In the
same community," "at a particular place," are phrases commonly
found in the cases.1 7 On one occasion this rule was broadened to include "similar communities." ' The Court has also held that acts that
resulted in burning off a baby's fingers "could not be considered acceptable medical practice in any community."19 In this same opinion
remarks can be found which indicate that the Florida Supreme Court
20
is on the point of abandoning the locality rule altogether.
12Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1954).
13Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 707, 170 So. 459, 463 (1936).
1441 AM. JUR., Physicians and Surgeons §90, at 208-09, and cases cited therein.
15Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307, 311 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
1641

Am.JuR., Physicians and Surgeons §87, at 205.

17E.g., Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Hill v. Boughton,
146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941).

lsBourgeois v. Dade County, 99 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1956).
19Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955).
2OIbid. The Court approved arguments of plaintiff's counsel as "well taken"
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That the standard of skill and care in malpractice cases has been
internal, fixed within the profession itself, and not external, fixed
by the community at large under the doctrine of the reasonable man,
is nowhere better illustrated than in the use of dangerous instrumentalities. No one can doubt that X rays, radium, electricity, or
anesthetics are potentially dangerous. Doctors are not, of course,
insurers against injury from them.21 But appellate court opinions
have not mentioned "exceptional precautions," or "stricter responsibility," or "care proportional to the danger created" -phrases that
abound in the treatment of such dangerous instrumentalities as explosives, firearms, or even railroad trains.22 In dealing with inherently
dangerous matters, the doctor has been held merely to the same standard which he would follow "in the performance of professional services
generally," as determined by his colleagues. 23 For example, it has
been held error to require an X-ray operator to observe a "high degree
of care."

24

In Hudson v. Weiland,25 in which allegedly careless treatment
forced the amputation of two fingers, a diathermist, under the doctor's
supervision, administered to the plaintiff a twenty-minute treatment
with an electrical diathermy machine, a "highly dangerous instrument." The plaintiff repeatedly complained of intense pain, and at
the end of the treatment showed the defendant her burned arm and
wrist. The doctor, nevertheless, prescribed a second treatment of the
same duration and intensity over the plaintiff's protests. 26 In affirming
judgment for the doctor on the pleadings, the appellate court majority
simply stated that it found an insufficient averment of facts showing
negligence. The dissent sought to apply the standard of care set forth

when they urged that the increase in the number of medical schools, free interchange of scientific information, and a tendency to harmonize medical standards
have deprived the locality rule of its force. "[B]ut we do not in any event consider
the [locality] rule to necessitate a reversal under the facts of this case," since
"proximate cause does not change with the locality." See also Atkins v. Humes,
110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959).
2lSee Nixon v. Pfahler, 279 Pa. 377, 124 Ad. 130 (1924).
2238 AAf. Jtm., Negligence §85, at 742-45.
23BARROWCLOUGH and NATHAN, MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE 19-36
(1957); REGAN,
DocTOR, PATIENT, AND THE LAW 53, 54 (3d ed. 1956); 41 AM. JUR., Physicians and
Surgeons §89, at 207-08, §95, at 212-13.
24Butler v. Rule, 29 Ariz. 379, 242 Pac. 436 (1926).
25150 Fla. 523, 8 So.2d 37 (1942).
261d. at 529, 8 So.2d at 39.
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in Saunders v. Lischkoff,27 in which a doctor was found negligent for
failure to make a close check of his patient, which the use of atropine
in the patient's eyes required. But the dissent did not say that such
a close check, or heeding of warning, formed any part of the duty of
the doctor in the instant case. It may have thought so. It did not
say so.
Workers with dangerous objects frequently become careless; they
acquire contempt bred from familiarity. The law must oppose this
tendency. As Justice Hand has said, "A whole calling... may never
set its own tests, however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in
the end say what is required." 28 The courts have held the practice of
medicine to be so incomprehensible to laymen that this universal
sanction can be ignored, and have permitted doctors alone, of all
classes, to define their own duty. By letting them plead prevailing
custom virtually without restriction, the courts have granted to doc29
tors a privilege enjoyed by no other group.
STANDARD OF PROOF

In the medical profession, the term malpractice is a dirty word.
The medical and judicial mind have often equated "malpractice" with
"willful wrong," "gross carelessness," or "criminal neglect."3 ° The
term is an unfortunate misnomer. It does kindle an idea of something worse than mere carelessness. A different name, perhaps medical
negligence, might aid in re-evaluating thinking in this area of negligence law. Until recently the judicial vision has been blurred by
popular folklore surrounding the medical profession. This was evident from Florida Supreme Court opinions which reflected innocence
or guilt rather than departure from a technical standard of care. When
27137

Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939).

28The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). (Emphasis added.) See
also Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462, 467 (Fla. 1958), in which the Court, holding that
all parties dealing with inherently dangerous elements are jointly liable, said that
"to hold otherwise would result necessarily in the anomaly of fault without liability
and wrong without a remedy, . . . directly conflicting with the express mandate
of the Florida Constitution ...."
29Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Webb, 112 Fla. 449, 150 So. 741 (1933); Carter v. J. Ray
Arnold Lumber Co., 83 Fla. 470, 91 So. 893 (1922).
30See Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905), in which a doctor's alleged
criminal negligence led to a charge of manslaughter. The lower court properly
charged the jury that they must feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty,
of the truth of the charge. It is astonishing to find the same language sometimes
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the Supreme Court spoke in terms of the quantum of proof necessary
to show medical negligence as being a conviction to a moral certainty,3 1
one could well rub his eyes in wonderment.
Nowhere was there a more dramatic statement of the then prevailing judicial view that doctors were a breed apart, to be accorded
unwarranted legal protection for their mistakes, than the Supreme
32
Court's language in Fosterv. Thornton:

"In cases arising from charges of malpractice, the sum of
money involved, regardlessof its size, is a mere gesture in comparison with the professional character and reputation of the

defendant. He should not therefore, be condemned on evidence
that does not point conclusively to his negligence."
The Court also discussed proof of medical negligence by circumstantial evidence, stating that since conclusive proof of medical negligence was necessary, circumstances not only had to point exclusively
to negligence but also had to be inconsistent with any other conclusion.
Justice Ellis, speaking for four other justices in a supplemental opinion, said that in a complex anatomical question as to causality of a
pathological condition, "the technical rules of law by which the
sufficiency of evidence as to ordinary or usual transactions between man
and man is determined seem to be inadequate to enable one . . .to
arrive at a conviction to a moral certainty as to cause."33

"A conviction to a moral certainty" is synonymous with "beyond
a reasonable doubt"; the equivalence of the two expressions is accepted flatly by the courts in criminal law.3' The dear implication
has been that malpractice is more than negligence, is akin to a crime,
and requires the same degree of proof. To illustrate, the Florida
Supreme Court has even said that one could not convict a surgeon
of negligence "if he was exercising the best approved methods known
used in civil charges.
3aFoster v. Thornton, 119 Fla. 49, 160 So. 490 (1934).
32125 Fla. 699, 707, 170 So. 459, 463 (1936). (Emphasis added.) But see Stauf v.
Holden, 94 So.2d 361, 362 (Fla. 1957), in which an instruction containing this language was held improper, since the observation was obiter dicta and did not report

"the effect of the observation" of the justice who wrote the opinion "relating, as an
abstract proposition, to the issues in malpractice suits."
3s119 Fla. 49, 67, 160 So. 490, 497 (1934). (Emphasis added.)

34E.g., Witherspoon v. State, 76 Fla. 445, 80 So. 61 (1918); Lovett v. State, 30
Fla. 142, 11 So. 550 (1892).
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to medical science with care and diligence. ' ' 35
When a court bases its decision for a defendant doctor in great
part on testimony such as "the bad results could have happened with
the surgery being perfectly competent," or that it was "possible" to
cut an intestine without knowing it,36 has it not moved beyond the
boundaries of proof by a preponderance of evidence, as required in
ordinary negligence suits? Does it not follow that to require a plaintiff to prove liability beyond the exclusion of a bare possibility is to
hand the doctor a probative weapon of inestimable strength? Almost
anything could have happened in most factual situations. The very
meaning of preponderance lies wholly in probability - not possibility.
If the bare possibility that the defendant doctor was not negligent
were allowed to him as a defense, this would violate the basic concept
of due process and essential fairness inherent in the Anglo-American
common law system of jurisprudence. Yet this, until recently, is what
has happened.
PROXIMATE CAUSE

Another stumbling block in the proof of medical malpractice, due
in no small measure to the nature of the beast, has been the problem
of proximate cause. Although proximate cause is a basic ingredient
in all negligence actions, in medical malpractice cases the defense of
"lack of proximate cause" has become a remarkable weapon in the
3
hands of the defendant doctor. Of the sixteen malpractice cases
that have reached the appellate courts, nine were favorable to the
doctor and only seven went well for the plaintiff. Of the latter, five
were quite dramatic - far different from the typical case of medical
carelessness. 38 Recovery for the plaintiff has been rare in the typical
case, defeat coming more often from failure to prove proximate cause
39
than failure of proof of carelessness alone.
Unlike the collision victim, a malpractice client is usually physically hapless before the doctor sees him. An elderly woman with a
S5Horowitz v. Schwartz, 74 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1954). See also Appendix, Table I,
infra. This ill-concealed judicial requirement has now been discarded. See Atkins v.
Humes, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959).
36Horowitz v. Schwartz, 74 So.2d 801, 803-04 (Fla. 1954).
37See Appendix, Table I, infra.
38SIbid. The five cases are Foster v. Thornton, Saunders v. Lichkoff, Montgomery v. Stary, Smith v. Zeagler, Baldor v. Rogers.
39See Wilson, Malpractice Litigation: Recent Breaches in the Traditional Bar-

riers, 36 TEXAS L. REV. 209 (1957).
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broken leg may stand only one chance in four of a good union. Who
can say with any certainty that a doctor's carelessness proximately
caused her permanent limp?40 There are often multiple causes of
personal injury in malpractice cases, any one of which could have
42
4
been proximate, especially in the fields of obstetrics, 1 diagnostics,
orthopedics- and surgery. 44 Even a rigidly honest witness may have
trouble in swearing that a colleague's treatment was the cause. By
merely saying "possibly" instead of "probably," such a witness could
ruin the plaintiff's case. What would perhaps be thought permissible
hedging has become, in the peculiar frame of medical negligence
rules, a legal bar to recovery. 45 By testifying that "although not the
usual thing, an intensive case of phlebitis would cause not only
blisters, but destruction of tissue 'to the point of gangrene' without
any application of heat," an expert witness could completely negate
the plaintiff's testimony that excessive heat from a crude appliance
caused burns and ulcers.46 When the defendant doctor testified that
Volkmann's contracture, or claw hand, could come from (1) arterial
spasm, (2) arterial constriction by the broken bone, (3) haematoma,
(4) thrombus, (5) embolus, (6) constricting bandages or (7) veinous
obstruction, and could get an agreement from the plaintiff's expert as
well, what chance did the plaintiff have of proving that the damage
47
was actually caused by an improper cast?
If the testimony of the plaintiff's expert was not sufficiently uncertain, the court could lend a hand. In Horowitz v. Schwartz,"
dealing with the alleged cutting of a colon during an appendectomy,
the trial judge took up questioning of a witness who must have been
favorable for the plaintiff's side and asked, "Are you prepared to and
can you express the opinion with confidence in the accuracy of the
opinion, that the transection was caused by the surgeon's knife?" The
witness, an honest doctor, could only answer, "[I]t is with reasonable
4OKuhn v. Banker, 133 Ohio St. 304, 13 N.E.2d 242 (1938); for the sort of case
that makes lawyers see red, see TPAcy, THE DOCTOR As A WrrNEss 140-42 (1957),

by an old-school lawyer, not a latter-day negligence specialist.
4lFriedman, Obstetrics, Gynecology, and the Law, 86 MFD. TiMes 100-101 (1958).
42Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941).
43Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
44Horowitz v. Schwartz, 74 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1954).
45Edwards v. Wiggins, 114 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio App. 1953).
46Grubbs v. McShane, 144 Fla. 585, 588, 198 So. 208, 210 (1940).
added.)
47Atldns v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).

(Emphasis

4874 So.2d 801, 803 (Fla. 1954).
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accuracy that we can assume that this bowel was probably . . .
damaged during the previous operative procedure." To the court's
question as to whether the result was commensurate with the usual
medical standards in the community, the doctor stated, "Yes, it is
perfectly possible in the presence of an abscess to cut into an intestine
without knowing it." On the basis of such a "possibility," the court
directed a verdict for the defendant49
The "substantial factor" test of proximate cause 0 apparently has
not been asserted in medical negligence cases in Florida, although the
principle has been asserted and followed in ordinary negligence cases. 51
It would seem rather that, among multiple causes, the doctor's
act must have b~en named as the sole and undisputed cause, else he
escaped liability.5

2

Nor does the result of treatment, however bad,

raise a presumption of negligence.5 3 The doctor is presumed to have
acted with ordinary skill and care. If he so acted, it avails the plain54
tiff nothing to show that the bad result might have been avoided.
For example, when a doctor persisted in an unsuccessful and unorthodox treatment of cancer for nine months, while it spread from lip to
chin, 55 and failed to recommend radium, X ray or surgery, the Florida
Supreme Court held the doctor not negligent, on the ground that the
49This examination of the witness by the trial court is a glaring example of the
prevailing judicial favoritism toward the medical profession, where "possibility"
rather than "probability" has exculpated the surgeon. However, in Atkins v.
Humes, 110 So.2d 663. 668 (Fla. 1959), the Court stated, as to causation: "[M]any
courts hold that it is improper for an expert to testify that the alleged malpractice
did occasion the result complained of, as distinguished from expert testimony that
the alleged malpractice could occasion the result. See DeGroot v. Winter, 261 Mich.
660, 247 N.Wi 69 (1933), in which the court said: '0 0 * when a result could have
been occasioned by one of two or more causes, the ultimate fact of which cause
occasioned the result is for determination by the jury, and a medical expert may
not, in the case of conflicting evidence, invade the province of the jury and testify
that the result was in fact occasioned by one cause only.'" From this it would
appear that, in questions of disputed multiple causation, a jury must determine the
issue as to whether defendant doctor's alleged misconduct, more likely than not,
was the cause of plaintiff's injury. The effect, for practical purposes, is to allow
plaintiffs to by-pass summary judgments and directed verdicts, and to reach Nirvana
- the jury.

50This rule is stated clearly in Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185, 191 (Fla. 1953).
51See note 50 supra; PROSSER, TORTS §44, at 221

(2d ed. 1955); RESTATEMFNT,

ToRTs §431, at 1159 (1934).
52See note 49 supra.
53See 41 AM. JUR., Physiciansand Surgeons § 127, at 237.
541d. §104, at 219.
55Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1954).
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patient had declined surgery before he consulted the defendant.56
When exceptionally bad results flow from abandonment or gross
inattention,57 or when the results outrage common sense,58 all of
which violate the image of the doctor as a wise and kindly healer,
the plaintiff has been more successful. But simple carelessness or mere
neglect apparently could not be equated with a son of Hippocrates,
and near-insuperable obstacles have barred recovery, even when the
doctor was on notice that something was going wrong.
For instance, negligence in X-ray or diathermy treatment would
seem easy to prove. This has not been so. 59 Here is an aspect of

medical negligence that puzzles the layman more than almost any
other divergence from ordinary rulings. Warning has had little evidentiary weight. A sign in front of an excavation, heavy traffic at an
unmarked intersection, a multitude of oral, printed, or factual warnings are important and often crucial in the ordinary negligence case.
In medical negligence, however, the patient's plea of "Stop! You're
burning me!" has had little legal effect, even when he was right.60 A
husband's repeated demand that his wife's chest be X-rayed to find
the missing teeth was brushed off. The husband was right and the
doctor was wrong, yet the doctor was held not negligent because
61
none of his colleagues would name him so.

Ot the two appellate cases in which bad diagnosis was the principal
issue, plaintiffs have lost both.62 In matters of diagnosis the doctor
has been required to use his "best judgment." But who can evaluate
a mental quality? In a field in which the whole profession is
admittedly shaky, other doctors have hesitated to condemn a colleague
for a mistake that they may make tomorrow. Courts elsewhere have
taken judicial notice of the fact that in modern practice certain
56On rehearing, the Court held (4-3) that the doctor should have told plaintiff
that his treatment was failing and suggested some other remedy.
57Baldor v. Rogers, supra note 55; Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So.
815 (1939). Dohr v. Smith, 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958), is an exception to this
generality; a layman would say that the facts showed negligence of surgeon as
well as of anesthetist.
GsSee Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955), in which the experts'
efforts to obscure proximate cause did not deflect the Court.
s9See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
GHudson v. Weiland, 150 Fla. 523, 8 So.2d 37 (1942); Grubbs v. McShane, 144
Fla. 585, 198 So. 208 (1940).

6'Dohr v. Smith, 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958).
2Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Hill v. Boughton,
146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941).
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diagnostic tests are mandatory, such as X rays for fractures,63 and
biopsies before diagnosing cancer of some tissues.6 4 But ordinarily it
has been left for local colleagues to say whether the diagnosis was
standard.
In Hill v. Boughton the Court set out the necessary allegations
if bad diagnosis was to be proved.65 Among them was a declaration of
what malady the patient actually had and its symptoms at the time
of the examination. Since this case involved a girl alleged to have
been wrongly diagnosed as tubercular and put to bed for thirteen
months, probably the only doctor in the world who could testify as
to these required points would have been the defendant himself. And
the Court cited an Idaho case 6 in which it was held that if the
treatment happened to be correct, the error in diagnosis would not
be negligence.
Municipal corporations and hospitals seem to have fared much
worse than doctors in their efforts to escape liability for medical negligence. Carelessness, without conclusive proof of proximate cause, has
not imposed liability on a doctor.67 It may very well impose liability
upon a corporation or a hospital. 68 Technical evidentiary aids seldom
have been allowed against a doctor. However, they have often been
allowed in suits against hospitals and municipal corporations. The
Florida Supreme Court has squarely applied the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which it has always refused to use against a doctor, in the
case of a patient burned while unconscious in a hospital.6 9 The Court
0
said:7
"[T]he instant action was not one against a doctor, bringing
into question the proper exercise of his professional skill. The
party charged ... is an institution, doubtless supplied with all
manner of contrivances designed to alleviate pain and cure
63E.g., Reynolds v. Struble, 128 Cal. App. 716, 18 P.2d 690 (1933).

64E.g., Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
65146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 610 (1941).

66Osborn v. Carey, 24 Idaho 158, 132 Pac. 967 (1918).
67Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939); Atkins v. Humes, 107
So.2d 253 (2d D. C. A. Fla. 1958); Ramberg v. Morgan, 209 Iowa 474, 218 N.W. 492
(1928); Michael v. Roberts, 91 N.H. 499, 23 A.2d 361 (1941).
68E.g., Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952), in
which a city was held liable for failure to provide prompt medical assistance,
even though it might not have saved the patient.
69West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1951).
701d. at 803.

(Emphasis added.)
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disease when properly used by one fitted in that respect or

under the direction of one so qualified."
The cases also fllustrate that proof of carelessness, as well as of
proximate cause, has been further complicated because the facts to
show it have been often in the possession of the defendant doctor
and no one else. He was alone, practically speaking, when he removed
the tonsils or the appendix. "The patient may or may not know
what is done. He seldom knows its significance."7' Others, if present,
are usually the subordinates of the defendant, or his professional colleagues. All the records are kept by persons presumably favorable to
the doctor. And other doctors, called in to make examination perhaps
a year after the event, are rarely sure enough of their findings flatly
to contradict the doctor's story.72 "In short, the physician has the ad73
vantage of knowledge and of proof."
Further, a doctor's admissions have been of much less value than
in ordinary negligence cases. "I was driving 60 miles an hour" as an
admission is immediately available to the jury. But "I nipped her
bladder" has been of little weight as evidence for the jury unless an
expert testified that the act admitted by the doctor was in fact the
74
proximate cause and was done negligently.
In short, the doctor has been the beneficiary of an attitude and
a set of heavily qualified rules that raise him above all the community.
Although the Florida Supreme Court has since outwardly swerved
away from prior decisions in Atkins v. Humes,75 these attitudes and
qualified rules will remain until diminished by further rulings of the
Court, invisibly lurking behind every judicial bench, and occasionally
even sitting on the bench itself.
TYRANNY OF THE EXPERT

"No expert, no case" has been the average lawyer's opinion of
medical negligence suits, and in most factual situations he has been
-lChristie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
72Horowitz v. Schwartz, 74 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1954).
73Christie v. Callahan, 124 F.2d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
74 Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943); Modrzynski v. Lust, 55 Ohio L. Abs.
106, 88 N.E.2d 76 (1949). A defendant doctor's testimony and admissions are given
greater weight now in view of Atkins v. Humes.
75Atkins v. Humes, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959).
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right. From the first case 76 until recently, 77 the Florida appellate
courts followed the rule that although lay witnesses were competent
to testify when want of skill and care were so gross as to be obvious,
or when the facts lay within the area of common knowledge and experience, generally the testimony of an expert witness was required to
sustain a malpractice action. 7 Lay testimony, under prior evidentiary

principles in malpractice cases, usually carried less weight than expert testimony. When the trumpets of the defense doctors had blown,
little was left of a carefully laid up wall of facts sworn to by ordinary
men. What was usually called a layman's "casual" examination 79
could not stand up against a medical expert's opinion.
Expert testimony heretofore subserved two vital functions. Except
in rare cases, it established the standard of care against which the
defendant doctor's conduct was measured. The same expert, especially
if he was defendant's witness, usually testified that the defendant's
conduct did not deviate from the arbitrary standard that the expert
had established.
The force of the expert rule depended in part on who was an
expert. Generally, any doctor qualified as such under the trial court's
discretion was an expert s and could testify on any medical question,
even though he had never seen or treated a similar case."' His experience affected the weight of his testimony but not its admissibility.
However, through judicial idealization of the doctor as a professional
man, few jurors were deemed equipped with sufficient intelligence
to weigh conflicting medical testimony and properly to evaluate it.
Moreover, the Florida courts, unlike some other jurisdictions,82 have
allowed the medical expert the broadest latitude in his expression of
8

opinion.

3

76Foster v. Thornton, 113 Fla. 600, 604, 152 So. 667, 669 (1933), quoting Justice
Taft's famous opinion in Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 (S.D. Ohio 1897).
77Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). rev'd, 110 So.2d 663

(1959).
78E.g., Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d 253 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); Montgomery v.

Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
7gjackovach v. Yocom, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
SoSee

REGAN,

DocTOR,

PATIENT, AND THE LAW

177 (3d ed. 1956).

SiTullis v. Kidd, 12 Ala. 0648 (1847).
82See Diamond, Opinion or Conclusion? Evidence or Speculation?,
YER'S

TRIAL

LAW-

GUIDE 269-96 (1958); Comment, 2 VILL. L. REV. 95 (1956).

s3The authors have been unable to find any Florida decision restricting the
medical expert's permissible testimony, except that in Atkins v. Humes the Supreme
Court questioned the expert's right to say did rather than could, as usurping the
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In ordinary negligence cases, the general rule regarding expert
84
testimony has been stated to be:
"[I]t is still the sole province of the jury to accept or reject the
testimony of the expert witness, regardless of how respectable
and qualified that witness may be, and the jury is in no wise
bound by the expert's conclusions, any more than it is bound
by the testimony of any other witness."
In most American jurisdictions, however, and in Florida before the
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Humes, the judicial mind considered medical knowledge far beyond the comprehension of the
average person.8 5 The Florida Supreme Court once quoted, for example, that "a layman can have no knowledge at all" about "the
mysterious and dread disease of glaucoma,"8 6 thus giving added judicial weight to the testimony of experts, in direct violation of the
general rule. In several Canadian provinces, the treatment of expert
testimony is met openly and unhypocritically; juries are not allowed
87
to sit on malpractice cases in which expert testimony is to be given.
The conclusion that medical expert testimony in malpractice cases
has been deemed conclusive on juries is impossible to prove; no ruling
confirms it.88 Yet how else can one explain the abnormal frequency
of directed verdicts and summary judgments favoring defendant
doctors?80 Prior to Atkins v. Humes, only three Florida cases 0 have
been found that put the doctor on equal footing with other experts.
The issue in one was whether a decedent was in good health when he
function of the jury.
84Millar v. Tropical Gables Corp., 99 So.2d 589, 591 (Fla. 1958). For a
similar ruling in a case concerning an attorney's fee, see Folmar v. Davis, 108 So.2d
772 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
8B5eane v. Perle),, 99 N.H. 309, 109 A.2d 848 (1954).
86Foster v. Thornton, 113 Fla. 600, 604, 152 So. 667, 669 (1933), quoting Justice
Taft's opinion wherein he lays bare the whole mystique of the problem, to use a
word lately popular.
MALPRACTICE LTABILrrY 191 (1956).
88But see Foster v. Thornton, 119 Fla. 49, 160 So. 490 (1935); at least one
justice threw up his hands in awe as he faced the mysteries of human anatomy.
SOIn Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties almost two thirds of the cases
actually tried have been decided for defendant by summary judgment or directed
verdict. See Appendix, Table II, infra.
DoGulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, infra note 91; Woolin & Son, Inc. v. McKain,
110 So.2d 92 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959); Kovacs v. Venetian Sedan Serv., Inc., infra note

S7MaERmu,

92.
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applied for an insurance policy; 91 another was a personal injury
case.9 2 In all three cases the appellate court held that the credibility
and reasonableness of the doctor's testimony were questions for the

jury to determine, and that the jury could reject the expert and rely
on the lay evidence. 93 No malpractice case before Atkins v. Humes cut
the doctor-witness down to size.
Few would object to the central role of the expert in medical
negligence suits if he were both available and impartial. That he has
been neither available nor impartial is notorious; this has been written
94
about so much that little more need be said about it.
This "shocking, unethical reluctance on the part of the medical profession to accept its obligations to society"' 5 is a reality. It has been labeled "the
conspiracy of silence." 96 In one survey eighteen out of twenty-two
doctors admitted that a general refusal to testify existsY When medical societies punish or expel members who have testified against

fellow members, is this not clearly contrary to public policy?98 But,
9'Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 155 Fla. 586, 21 So.2d 39 (1945).
92 Kovacs v. Venetian Sedan Serv., Inc., 108 So.2d 611 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
931n Woolin & Son, Inc. v. McKain, supra note 90, at 93, it was stated, "The
crucial isstie in this case cannot be decided on the testimony of the chiropractor
and the medical doctor alone." The evidence showed "an unbroken chain of circumstances and events which directly connect the injury with the death of the
claimant . . . . These facts, supported by the opinion of the chiropractor . . .
were of greater probative force, in my opinion, than the expert opinion of the
medical doctor to the contrary." (Emphasis added.)
94For judicial notice of doctors' reluctance to testify see Huffman v. Lindquist,
37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951); Butts v. Watts, 290 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1956);
Johnson v. Winston, 68 Neb. 425, 94 N.W. 607 (1903); Steiginga v. Thron, infra
note 95; Edward v. West Texas Hospital, 89 S.W.2d 801 (Texas Civ. App. 1935).
For legislation see Wis. STAT. §147.14(2) (1951), giving out-of-state doctors the
right to testify-a measure of the gravity of the situation. For one of the best
of many discussions of the subject, see Comment, 2 VILL. L. REV. 95, 99 (1956).
For a charitable view see McCoid, Reappraisalof Liability for Unauthorized Medical
Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REv. 381, 433 (1957). In Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34
(Fla. 1955), Chicago doctors had to be used for the plaintiff.
9sSteiginga v. Thron, 30 N.J. Super. 423, 105 A.2d 10 (App. Div. 1954).
96
BELLI, READY FOP THE PLAINTIFF 91 (1956). Also it is interesting to note that
although it is an indictable offense at common law and by statute in Florida to
dissuade or prevent a witness from testifying, this weapon, so far as is known, has
not been used to assure the availability of impartial testimony in malpractice
cases. See FLA. STAT. §833.01 (6), (7) (1957); State ex rel. Frazier v. Coleman, 156
Fla. 413, 23 So.2d 477 (1945).
97Note, 9 STAN. L. REV. 731, 758 (1957).
98
See Bernstein v. Alameda-Contra Costa Med. Ass'n, 139 Cal. App. 2d 241, 293
P.2d 862 (1956), in which the court ordered reinstatement of a doctor ejected from
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here again, precious little can be done about it by aggrieved patients
and their frustrated lawyers.
Despite the pious avowal of the American Medical Association in
its Principles of Medical Ethics that "the medical profession should
safeguard the public and itself against physicians deficient in moral
character or professional competence," 9 no one need expect that doctors will mount the witness stand eagerly for a plaintiff with a charge
of carelessness against a fellow doctor.
Defendants' experts go all out. Quick to give an opinion favorable
to a fellow member of their profession, falling easily into the expert's
habit of dogmatizing from limited experience, setting unrealistic
standards for the defendant, flattered by the adulatory awe and respect
of the bench, conscious of a definite but indirect interest in the verdict- they send not to ask for whom the bell tolls; it may toll for
them tomorrow -the defendant's colleagues have usually found it
possible to approve his conduct, no matter how flagrant. 100
In some jurisdictions trial courts have allowed the plaintiff to use
the expert testimony of a naturopath, chiropractor or a practitioner in
a near-medical field. Having technically met the requirement of expert medical testimony, some counsel have thereafter successfully built
a case largely on lay proof.' ' Whether such a method to escape the
tyranny of the expert has been tried in Florida is not known. Conversely, however, a trial court can scuttle the plaintiff's case by refusing
to allow the plaintiff's "expert" to testify as such.o2
By and large, however, the plaintiff's counsel cannot expect too
T

his medical society for testifying adversely to a colleague.
991 LAwYERs MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA 24 (1958). This is the 1957 revision; it is

much weaker than the 1954 code, which said: "A physician should expose, without
fear or favor, incompetent or corrupt, dishonest or unethical conduct on the part
of members of the profession." Principles of Medical Ethics of the American
Medical Association, c. 3,§4 (1954).
190Egregious examples are common. We need not lean on Belli's shocking
tales in READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF, nor on the flamboyant editorializing in the
NACCA Law Journals. An hour's reading of the cases will turn up at least one
instance of testimony incredible to a layman. One question is the touchstone: has
the reader ever heard of a malpractice suit in which the defendant lacked help
from fellow doctors? For Florida, see Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla.
1955).
lolSee BELLI, READY FOR THE PLAINTIFF (1956); 11 NACCA L.J. 172, 176-77
(1953). See also FLA. STAT. §46a.12 (1957), which provides that optometrists' testi-

mony relative to the diagnosis of the human eye shall be considered as qualified
expert testimony.
*12Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 234 P.2d 34 (1951).
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much wholehearted help from his expert, if he finds one and the
court qualifies him as such. His man is likely to have lost on the stand
much of the conviction he displayed when consulted privately. As an
honest man, under cross-examination he often admits that he cannot
say positively that the defendant did the damage. 1 0 3 As a conscientious
doctor he is hard pressed to make bold and positive statements assaulting the quality of a fellow doctor's technique. He is under the disability of knowing that every word he says in behalf of the plaintiff
damns him in the eyes of his local colleagues. He is aware of violating
the often unspoken conspiracy of silence. The fundamental damage
which this dichotomy of evidentiary vigor -clear certainty for the
defendant, qualified testimony for the plaintiff - has done to the adversary system is apparent. It has contained and conditioned nearly
all the differences which set the medical negligence case apart from all
others.
ESCAPE FROM THE EXPERT

If recovery is to be eased for meritorious plaintiffs,104 some way
must be found to relax or by-pass this Tyranny of the Expert. At
present there seem to be four possibilities: (1) use of medical texts
as substantive proof, (2) extension of the area of common knowledge,
(3) extension of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and (4) better use
of the defendant's own testimony.
Medical Texts
Florida follows the rule that medical books, no matter how authoritative, cannot be used as substantive proof, but may be used only "to
contradict a witness who has testified to having derived therefrom
teachings that they do not contain, or whose teachings are substan103Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307

(1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958), in

which the

Court notes the weakness of plaintiff's affidavits; Horowitz v. Schwartz, discussed p.
129 supra; Grubbs v. McShane, 144 Fla. 585, 198 So. 208 (1940), in which the
Court noted that plaintiff's experts failed to make a case.
4
10 One noted malpractice attorney emphasizes that great care should be exercised by an attorney before he proceeds with claim and suit against a doctor. He
also adds, however, that no soundly based malpractice suit ever hurts the medical
profession. On the contrary, such suits exert an indirect discipline on the profession. See Explore Problems, Causes of Rising Tide of Medical Malpractice
Claims, The National Underwriter (Feb. 13, 1959).
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tially different from that testified to."'' 05 This was until recently the
rule everywhere in the United States with the sole exception of Alabama.l0 r Massachusetts in 1949107 and Nevada in 19531 enacted laws
providing that the plaintiff, on showing that a text is standard and
authoritative, and after giving the defendant the title and the author's
name three days before trial, may use it as affirmative and substantial
proof. These laws accomplish the sine qua non; they get the case to
the jury.
The traditional objections to the admissibility of texts no longer
hold water. 09 Every statement in a standard work is the result of far
more earnest thought, honest weighing of pros and cons, and incomparably greater perception than is to be found in any local doctor's
opinion under oath. These texts synthesize the observations, techniques and conclusions of the most brilliant minds in the profession."10
Common Knowledge
The second avenue of escape may lie in extension of the area of
common knowledge; this has already begun in Florida, as well as in
other jurisdictions.", When several doctors testified that a baby's
10SEggert v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 538, 25 So. 144, 147 (1898).
106Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857), a fine reductio ad absurdem of the standard rule.
'107MAsS. ANN. LAWS c. 233, §79c (1949).
1O8Nev. Laws 1953, c. 100, §1.
lo0Stoudenmeler v. Williamson, supra note 106; 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1690-91
(3d ed. 1940).
2i0The use of texts under present rulings has become a bitter and frustrating
game. See TRACY, DocTOR As WrrNESS 94 (1957), quoting McCord in 22 Indus.
Med. and Surg. No. 2, 56, 60 (Feb. 1953): "[I]f the testimony of others is wanted,
let those others be brought into the courtroom for examination. A bit of arrogance
is involved in this fencing match, but much difficulty will be avoided provided the
witness fully declines to pick out who are the 'Authorities.' . . . Usually, the court
will support this attitude." If this advice can be put into print, what must be the
real depth of chicanery?
"'See Goodwin v. Hertzberg, 201 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Byrom v. Eastern
Disp. and Cas. Hosp., 136 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Soest v. Balsinger, 60 Cal. App.
2d 441, 141 P.2d 13 (1943) (common knowledge - dirty instruments cause infection);
Thomsen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal. App. 2d 235, 79 P.2d 136 (1938) (removal of soft
palate not a proper part of tonsillectomy); Taylor v. Milton, 353 Mich. 421, 92
N.W.2d 57 (1958); Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941) (patient's warning that he is allergic to a medicine should prevent doctor's prescribing
it a second time); Rural Educ. Ass'n v. Bush, 298 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1957) (hypodermic needles break if thrust against bone carelessly); and, of course, X ray and biopsy
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fingers were lost through bad circulation and not "needlessly burned
off"112 the Florida Supreme Court held that the jury could have found
the defendants liable "independent of expert testimony," but was
constrained to add that only one doctor's testimony "was needed to
sustain the verdicts of the jury." Common knowledge and lay testimony appeared decisive in Dohr v. Smith113 against one of the defend-

ants who was an anesthetist. Even here, the Court stated that the
defendant's own testimony contributed largely to her liability, saying,
"The very caution she undertook to exercise undermines her position."114

A giant step in the right direction has been taken in Atkins v.
Humes. In a claim based on Volkmann's contracture allegedly caused
by the defendant's applying too tight a cast to the plaintiff's arm and
failing to heed warnings and relieve the pressure, the Second District
Court of Appeal affirmed summary judgment for the defendant on
the classic ground that there was a dearth of expert testimony for
the plaintiff, and that this was not an area for the exercise of common knowledge and experience of laymen. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, drawing heavily on Dohr v.
Smith and Montgomery v. Stary. The Court stated:115
"[Jiurors of ordinary intelligence, sense and judgment are,
in many cases, capable of reaching a conclusion, without the
aid of expert testimony, in a malpractice case involving a charge
of negligence in the application or administration of an approved medical treatment ....

"Even in those cases in which some expert testimony may be
required to show causation, the jurors may be authorized to
infer from the circumstances that the defendant was negligent
* . . despite the absence of direct expert testimony to this effect
and in the face of expert testimony to the contrary....
As is

well stated in Goodwin v. Hertzberg, supra, 201 F.2d 204, 205:
'It is immaterial that no expert testified that appellee acted negligently. "Malpractice is hard to prove.
must be used in certain cases. See

REGAN, op. cit. supra note 80, at 210-I1 for
other factual situations.
112Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955).
113104 So.2d 29 (1958).
114d. at 32.

115110 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1959). (Emphasis added.)
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The physician has all the advantage of position. * * a
What therefore might be slight evidence when there is
no such advantage, as in ordinary negligence cases, takes
on greater weight in malpractice suits. * * * Generally
speaking, direct and positive testimony to specific acts of
negligence is not required. * * a ....
This portion of the momentous opinion in the Atkins case recognizes that today a great number of medical facts are indeed generally
known. Jurors are far more experienced than ever before. It deftly
illustrates again the epigram cessante ratione legis, cessante et ipsa
lex.1G It also bids fair to undermine the Tyranny of the Expert in
Florida.
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Much stir has been created elsewhere by the increased use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in medical negligence cases. 117 This
route for escaping from the Tyranny of the Expert requires a "basis
of experience, either common to the community or brought out in
evidence," from which it can be inferred that in a given situation injuries do not normally occur without negligence.11s
In reading the spate of articles on res ipsa loquitur and malpractice, one must keep his eye constantly on the key words in the
standard definitions. Some of the writers, erroneously believing that
malpractice is more akin to a crime than to a tort, object to proof of
medical negligence through res ipsa loquitur because such proof is
not conclusive:19 To these cries of outrage must be opposed certain
reminders.
First, proof of negligence and proximate cause depends on a preponderance of the evidence; on probability, if you will, not on certainty. Res ipsa loquitur merely raises a rebuttable presumption of
negligence. It should not be incumbent on the plaintiff to prove
216Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1952).

See also Butts v. Watts, 290

SAV.2d 777 (Ky. 1956).
1'7See Morris, Res Ipsa Loquitur, TRIAL LAwYER'S GumE 395-450 (1957), for

a thorough study, mostly from the doctor's point of view. This author's own statistical table (id. at 430-31) shows that the alarm is exaggerated. See also Note
37 B.U.L. REv. 103 (1957).
1'SBauer v. Otis, 133 Cal. App. 2d 439, 284 P.2d 133 (1955).
1loMorris, supra note 117, at 402-03, 409.
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negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court of
0
Florida said in Atkins v. Humes:12

"Since medicine is not an exact science, it is difficult, if not
impossible, in malpractice cases to arrive at a conviction to a
moral certainty as to the cause of a pathological condition of
a person....
'If 1 1 * it is necessary to demonstrate conclusively
and beyond the possibility of a doubt that the negligence
resulted in the injury, it would never be possible to recover in a case of negligence in the practice of a profession which is not an exact science.' "
The doctrine merely recognizes that, under a given set of circumstances, injury does not ordinarily occur without negligence. "It is
no hardship upon the defendant to explain, as he alone can, how the
injury occurred."12 1 When a court has refused to apply the doctrine
when an injury may have occurred without negligence122 it has in substance modified the rules of evidence.
Second, except in the obvious case, the fundamental basis of res
ipsa loquitur as applied to malpractice cases frequently appears not
through common knowledge but through expert testimony. The
implication that the use of res ipsa loquitur to prove medical negligence will allow juries to speculate wildly in determining liability
is simply not true. Governance of, and lenience in applying, the doc12
trine rests with the court.

The application of res ipsa loquitur in other jurisdictions has
ranged from the obvious sponge-in-body cases, in which it has been
used for decades even in conservative jurisdictions,'2 through X-ray
burns,1 25 to the hotly disputed "calculated risk" cases of the last few
years, confined largely to one or two states.1 2 6 Its use in medical
120110 So.2d 663, 669 (Fla. 1959).

v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 287, 109 S.V.2d 417, 419 (1937).
122Morris, supra note 117, at 420, citing Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184-86
(3d Cir. 1951).
I21Meadows

123McConnell, Medical Malpractice Problems, 62 DICK. L. REV. 338-40 (1958).
124Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928).
l25The trend seems to be away from res ipsa here. See Note, 106 U. PA. L. REV.

731 (1958).
126McConnell,

supra note 123, at 335-45; Mills, Res Ipsa Loquitur and the
CALIF. L. REV. 80-88 (1956); Morris,

Calculated Risk in Medical Malpractice, 30 So.
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negligence cases has infuriated doctors and their counsel - who often
forget that stringent need brings harsh remedies- 127 and look on
res ipsa loquitur as a cognomen for "liability without fault." They
see red.128 They believe themselves to be the subjects of persecution,
even though some courts have added to the three traditional elements
129
of res ipsa a fourth: that the patient should be under anesthesia.
Clearly, this is illogical, since a patient's consciousness would rarely
affect the probability of negligence.
The Florida courts have consistently refused to apply the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur by name in suits against doctors, 130 although the
Supreme Court has wiggled on this point. In Foster v. Thornton"'
it acknowledged proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence, but
only if the proof was conclusive. Later, in Atkins v. Humes, the Court
stated that the plaintiff could prove negligence by circumstantial
evidence and that proof need not be conclusive, since medicine was
not an exact science. In Smith v. Zeagler"32 the Court ruled that if a
doctor left a sponge in a wound without explanation ex necessitate
rei, it was negligence per se.
In light of the Court's language in Tamiami Trail Tours v.
Locke1 33 that res ipsa loquitur "is merely a species of circumstantial
evidence," the Court should meet the problem head on. Since medical
negligence can be inferred from circumstantial evidence and proof
need not be conclusive,' 4 the Court should boldly take the last logical
step and announce that res ipsa loquitur can be used to prove medical
negligence.
Illustrative of the confusion in this area, in Hine v. Fox - the
supra note 117 passim; The California Malpractice Controversy, 9 STAN. L.

REY.

731,737-42 (1957).
127Morris, supra note 117, at 417-19.

"2SId. at 424-25.
'2'McConnell, supra note 123, at 339.

"3OReid v. Groom, 101 So.2d 22 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). In the lower court
(Case No. 36953, Cir. Ct. Dade County, 1956) plaintiff's counsel pleaded res ipsa,

alleging that cotton lint is not ordinarily found in an eye after surgery. The trial
judge refused to apply the doctrine; there was testimony that the lint could have
been floating in the air and that the surgeon's dressing was of different color. See
also Hine v. Fox, 89 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1956); Grubbs v. McShane, 144 Fla. 585, 198 So.
208 (1940); Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
"3125 Fla. 699, 705, 170 So. 459, 462 (1936).
132116 Fla. 628, 157 So. 328 (1934).
'75 So.2d 586, 589 (Fla. 1954) (concurring opinion).
"'4Atkins v. Humes, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959).
13589 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1956).
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Court pointed out that the majority rule is against the use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stating further that "in cases involving
charges of malpractice against a professional man, negligence will not
be presumed but must be proved. Cf., West Coast Hospital Ass'n v.
37
Webb ... ",136Yet in the Webb case the Court said:'
"Negligence may not be presumed, must be proved, but
where direct proof is wanting and such circumstances are shown
as to leave no conclusion except that the defendant was at fault,
a prima facie case may arise, justifying the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur."
In the Webb case there was no explanation whatever for burns
suffered by the plaintiff in a hospital. But the Court held that since
the hospital's control over the instrumentality was exclusive, somebody had been negligent, and found for the plaintiff. 38 Both the
lower and the appellate court applied res ipsa loquitur by name. The
Fox and Webb cases point out in an embarrassingly glaring manner
how the courts have accorded privileged evidentiary treatment to
doctors as opposed to hospitals. The distinction between hospitals and
doctors is clearly artificial, since the only difference noted in the
Webb case was the extensive equipment at hand in a hospital, which
is surely not crucial in this day of elaborately equipped medical
clinics and private doctors' modern offices.
Defendant's Testimony
The most successful method of countering the Tyranny of the
Expert is by proving the doctor's negligence through his own testimony or that of his own experts. In some jurisdictions, the defendant
may be put on the stand by the plaintiff's counsel without making the
defendant the plaintiff's own witness. 39 The Florida Rules of Civil
1361d. at 15. (Emphasis added.)
13752 So.2d 803, 804 (Fla. 1951).
13SEven in Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944), the famous
res ipsa case that shocked the medical profession, there was at least an enumeration
of possible tort-feasors.
3
1 9CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §2055, Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 147 P.2d 604
(1944). See also Stallcup v. Coscarart, 79 Ariz. 42, 282 P.2d 791 (1955). For a
collection of cases from other states, see 5 PERSONAL INJURY - CUSTOMs- DEFENSES
-DAMAGES
551, n.3 (1958).
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Procedure, adopted in 1954, make the same stratagem allowable under
the adverse party rule.140
There are obviously grave pitfalls in this approach. Anyone who
has watched a lawyer lead a doctor into a corner from which there
is no escape, unless he chooses to brand himself as either an ignoramus or a perjurer, has watched a work of art.14' But how many such
artists are available? There are few lawyers who can adequately match
wits with an able and articulate doctor, determined not to give an
answer favorable to the plaintiff. 42 To do it with the clarity that
will convince judge and jury alike requires a knowledge of the possible, as well as probable, answers to every question. Such learning
is not acquired in a few weeks of intermittent study just prior to
trial, which is, at best, what the average trial lawyer is able to do.
Hence the plaintiff with a legitimate suit is fortunate indeed to live
in one of the few cities where the famous "malpractice specialists" are
to be found.
THE

How AND

WHY OF MEDICAL PRIVILEGE

Why have the courts in most jurisdictions evolved special rules of
law favoring the medical profession? Why such glaring differences
between medical negligence and ordinary negligence?
The medical doctor is today riding the crest of a wave of popularity, or status. This was not always so.14 Status is an elusive, but
14ORule 1.37 (a). See also King, The Adverse Witness Statute and Expert Opinion, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 228 (1958).
141See Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,

1 Vii.. L. REv. 250 (1956), for a lecture on tactics by a master. For a thorough,
orthodox treatment of the handling of medical witnesses see Longan, Preparationof
Medical Testimony, 17 MoNT. L. REv. 121 (1956).
l42Beli, supra note 141.
' 43In 1924, ten years before the Florida Supreme Court, in Foster v. Thornton,
adopted the malpractice law that had grown up in other jurisdictions, especially
Ohio, there was tried in Palm Beach County a case in which the late Judge C. E.
Chillingworth indicated (judging chiefly by his charge to the jury) that he saw
no difference between a malpractice suit and any other kind of negligence suit.
(Sarvis v. Brantley, Case No. 2004, 15th Cir.) At issue was the alleged bad treatment of an arm fracture resulting in a crooked wrist and a claw hand. Defendant's
motion for a bill of particulars was denied. Defendant's requested instruction that
expert evidence was necessary to prove negligence was denied. The following instruction requested by plaintiff was given: "The court instructs the jury that proof
of negligence need not be by direct testimony, but may be inferred by the jury
from all the facts and circumstances in evidence in the case." The jury found
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pervasive, thing. Take a case like Landon v. Humphrey, 1832.144 A
woman being inoculated with cowpox suffers a cut tendon. No expert
witnesses. No talk of calculated risk. The defendant pleads in person,
and argues that only gross negligence should affix liability on a doctor
and that it is unfair that "some trifling want of carefulness should
take away his life's earnings." The trial court rules against him on
every point, citing 3 Blackstone's Commentaries 165, and on appeal
the jury verdict for plaintiff-patient is affirmed. It can be inferred
that Dr. Humphrey enjoyed no high status.
Compare 1832 with 1959. Besides gratitude for his very real
services, the doctor has drawn vicarious prestige from every new
and marvelous advance in the science of medicine. Note the wide
coverage given to medical conventions in the press, the frequent appearances of the doctor as hero in comic strips, magazine stories,
radio series, and television plays. In national advertising the doctor
is the ultimate authority on cathartics, cigarettes and vitamins. It is
not uncommon in many courtrooms during trial of a personal injury case to note an uncomplaining attitude of the bench, bar and
jury toward delays and recesses caused by a doctor's tardiness or
failure to appear.145 Read again the Florida cases prior to Atkins v.
Humes, and observe status at work.
Privilege does not reside forever in any class, and those who put
their faith in the force of changing circumstance would say that already the doctor as a hero is losing stature, for witness the increasing
number of lawsuits of all kinds against him.146 Several factors in the
for defendant. The case was not appealed.
1449 Conn. 209 (1832). See also Margolis, Medical Malpractice in Connecticut,
32 CONN. B.J. 51 (1958).
145At least one judge has commented with some asperity on this problem at
pretrial conference, stating that the time of all the personnel connected with a
trial is worth considerably more than that of any doctor unless he be engaged on a
life-or-death errand. (Owens v. Robertson, Case No. 58L264, Cir. Ct. Dade County,
July 1958.)
146A study of the 600-odd appellate cases for the period 1935-55 shows a downward trend, if anything, especially in view of the population growth. See Stetler,
The History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TENP. L.Q. 366,
377 (1957). This apparent downward trend is misleading. It probably means that
doctors are settling more often and appealing fewer cases. The authors' research
shows an upward, rather than a downward, trend in the number of cases filed.
See Appendix, Tables II, III, infra.
It is also interesting to note from the same research that doctors are sued about
twice as often for other causes as they are for malpractice, e.g., collection suits on
notes and open accounts, leases, mortgages, assault and battery, accidents because of
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process of debunking the present status of doctors can be given.
First, there is the rise of the large clinic and of increasing medical
specialization. More and more people live their entire lives without
a "family doctor." To increasing numbers of people the doctor is
brisk, efficient, businesslike and expensive. Many patients bemoan
the loss of easy familiarity, the comforting and friendly bedside
manner. The "doc" has become a stranger, and it is easy to sue a
stranger.
Second, the well-publicized progress of medical science is beginning to act paradoxically. The marvels are so many and come
so fast that the doctor is in danger of being looked upon as an automaton who merely has to follow the instructions on the label.
Third, the medical profession is fast becoming highly commercial.
Large fees, mass-production clinics, the callousness of hospital admission requirements, conspicuous spending, are fast destroying the ordinary man's reverence for the good doctor. The lay reaction to this is
succinct: "If it's going to be cash on the line, the goods had better
be satisfactory - or else."
The conservative voice would say, "Let things run their course.
The medical profession will shortly have destroyed all the reverence
which has given the doctor a privileged status. The malpractice suit
will, in time, cease to be a special kind of litigation with its own
rules. The doctor will, once again, be four square with the architect,
the chemist and the engineer." But the inevitable change of the
doctor's community status may take a long time. There are patients
now, and will be patients in the next decade or so, who will be deprived of equal treatment at law and denied recovery for injuries
resulting from a doctor's carelessness because of the specially privileged treatment given doctors in actions against them.
CONCLUSION - QUO VAMIS?

Lawyers and their patient-clients want a remedy for this situation
now. Most proposals seek various ways of making expert testimony
more available and more impartial. Those already in operation include the Minnesota plan, 47 under which testimony amounting to
perjury may be called to the attention of the appropriate medical and
faulty office premises, harboring vicious dogs, permitting cattle to trespass
a surprisingly large number of automobile accidents.
147See RXGAN, DOCTOR, PATIENT, AND THE LAW 203 (3d ed. 1956).
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legal committees;

the Baltimore "Neutral Expert Scheme";1 4 8

the

New York Medical Panel System; 149 the Los Angeles County Program, 15 0 another panel system relying on voluntary enrollment of
doctors in a list from which plaintiffs' counsel may choose, which
supposedly removes reluctance to testify because the plan is endorsed
by the county medical society; and various medico-legal symposia and
seminars.15x By 1958 medical associations in all states had set up
patient grievance committees; but this machinery inevitably works
against the plaintiff, since if no fault is found by these biased boards
it becomes doubly difficult to obtain expert testimony.
Louis J. Regan, both a doctor and a lawyer, has set out the most
plausibly fair system of all. On the premise that the present system
of adversary medical witnesses is corrupting and immoral, he proposes
that the court appoint experts from nominees submitted by both sides
with a right of challenge, and name, if necessary, one expert of its own
to sit on the panel thus constituted.152 This plan would actually
freeze the doctor's present advantage in litigation by raising the
expert's power.
The suggested remedies all have one common denominator: cooperation and understanding. But each suffers from the same disregard of social dynamics. Power is seldom humbled by sweet reason.
Seldom will a class or group voluntarily subject itself to curbs from
which it is exempt. Status never consciously commits suicide. Thus,
solution of the problem through co-operation and understanding is
unreal.
The problem is not one of dealing with thousands of individual
doctors who are, for the most part, honest, kindly and full of civic
spirit, but with canalized interests of a professional group, which
transcend the individual and lead him into certain acts and attitudes
whether he wills it or not. 5 3 Doctors are not free agents in this matter,
l4SComment, 2 VILL. L. REV. 95, 106 (1956).
149Working well, but used only in personal injury cases. See Botein, The New
York Medical Expert Testimony Project and Its Results to Date, 5 LA. B.J. 15

(1957).
15OThe CaliforniaMalpracticeControversy, 9 STAN. L. REV. 731, 745 (1957).
15'Stetler, Medical-Legal Relations - The Brighter Side, 2 VILL. L. REV. 487
(1957). The new National Interprofessional Code for Physicians and Attorneys,
adopted by the ABA and the AMA in 1958, offers nothing to cure the basic problem of the reluctant witness. Complaints are not to be publicly aired but referred
to the associations for processing. 45 A.B.A.J. 33 (1959).
5 2
1
REGAN, op. cit. supra note 147, at 205.
153See WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956) passim.
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as some of them privately will confess. They are subject to censure
or expulsion by their medical societies. They can be dropped from
hospital staffs. Their liability insurance can be canceled or their
rates increased. All this can be done without their ever being officially
cited for testimony against a fellow doctor. 5 4 Appeals to the individual to be co-operative and understanding are therefore futile.
Practically speaking, a power complex, based upon individual
self-interest funneled through and controlled by large-scale organizations, can be countered only by the sovereign acting through the
legislature and the judiciary. It is here that the force of circumstance
and the declining prestige of the doctor will, in the end, have their
say.
There may be changes through statute, evolving from the general
trends toward greater security, extension of strict liability, and other
socio-economic drives at present unpredictable, but for years to come
it is unlikely that a solution of this problem will be achieved by
legislative action. The present power of the medical and insurance
lobbies will endure, in some vigor at least, long after the doctor has
ceased to be a hero.
With the judiciary it is another matter. What the courts have
done in the past they can in some measure undo. The judiciary has
allowed the malpractice suit to depart from the general rules of negligence law. It is through the judiciary that it can be returned to something like the negligence suit for damages following the collapse of a
bridge. It is respectfully submitted that the judiciary can, in complete
accord with the cases in other fields of negligence law, adopt the
proposals outlined below.
Abolish the locality rule completely in establishing medical standards of care. At present, it is based on unsound premises. 55 The
Florida Supreme Court in Atkins v. Humes reiterates that proximate
cause does not change with locality.15 6 It only remains for the Court
to expand this idea to its logical conclusion that medical standards of
54Belli, Ready for the Plaintiff, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 408, 410, 416 (1957). Polsky,
The Malpractice Dilemma: A Cure for Frustration, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 359, 360-61
(1957), points out that the AMA has no policy that justifies a doctor in refusing
to testify, and that he has been unable to find any modem liability insurance
contract containing such a clause. Of course not. Such pressures are rarely spelled

out in print.
'25Note, 9 STAN. L. REv. 731, 735 (1957); see cases cited note 94 supra.
156110 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1959).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1959

29

Florida Law OF
Review,
Vol. 12, Iss.
2 [1959],
Art. 1
REVIEW
LAW
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY
care are no longer geographically determinative, in an era of ease and
freedom of specialized communication.
Extend the area of common knowledge. The Atkins case has made
a sizable step in this direction. The Supreme Court, in stating flatly
that in many cases jurors are capable of holding a doctor guilty of negligence, using their "ordinary intelligence, sense and judgment," without the aid of expert testimony, has opened the door. Moreover, in
stating that even when some expert testimony is necessary to show
causation, jurors can infer from circumstances that a doctor was
negligent, despite a lack of expert testimony to this effect and in the
face of expert testimony to the contrary, and that ""generally speaking, direct and positive testimony to specific acts of negligence is not
required,"'

"1157

the Court has gone a long way toward readjusting the

balance of power between injured patient and outraged doctor in the
courtroom.
Relieve the plaintiff from an insuperable burden of proof. Atkins
v. Humes frankly reverses the prevailing trend as to the quantum of
proof of medical negligence by receding from the requirement of
proof of negligence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is now enough in
Florida to prove that, more likely than not, the doctor was negligent.
It is urged that other jurisdictions harken to the clarion call of
courage sounded by the Florida Supreme Court.
Permit greater use of medical texts. Although the Alabama courts
allow free use of medical texts as substantive proof, 158 stare decisis
9
may impede the application of this rule in Florida courts. 1 Yet there
is no compelling reason why wider use of textbooks cannot be permitted on cross-examination, even when a medical witness professes
complete ignorance of them. A doctor's knowledge of such works and
his ability to discuss them even if he disagrees certainly go to the
l571bid. (Emphasis added.)

158Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857).
159But the reasoning of the Alabama court in Stoudenmeier v. Williamson,
quoted in Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 606, 188 So. 264, 266 (1939), should

some day prevail: "'Are opinions, derived from the perusal of books, and deposed
to by witnesses, safer guides for [the jury] than the books themselves are? . . .
Can that be a sound rule, which, in the determination of a question involved in
one science flaw], allows to the trying body the light shed upon it by the
writings of its standard authors, and withholds such lights from controversies
respecting all other sciences? We think not.' "
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very roots of his credibility. They also go to his ability as an expert
to assert a standard of care and to pass judgment upon a fellow doctor
on trial.
Allow the use of res ipsa loquitur in negligence actions against
doctors. To be sure, inference, no matter how strong, is of less probative weight than direct testimony in fixing civil liability. Yet in
areas of ordinary negligence, and in the matter of hospital negligence,
the doctrine is freely used when applicable. When the Supreme Court
allows an inference of negligence from the circumstances in Atkins v.
Humes, and recognizes negligence per se in Smith v. Zeagler, there is
no logical reason to deny the applicability of res ipsa loquitur against
a doctor. It does not accord with common sense to assert that in
negligence cases against doctors the thing never speaks for itself.
Recognize the fallibility of members of the medical profession.
Doctors are as human as lawyers, engineers and architects. They are
just as surely subject to making mistakes. Liability for their mistakes
should not be viewed differently by the judiciary. Doctors should be
accorded co-equal protection in the area of negligence with the members of any other skilled profession, and no more. 160 They should
be civilly responsible for ordinary negligence, and neither the medical
profession nor the judiciary should acknowledge liability only when
there has been willful wrong, gross carelessness, or criminal neglect.
Atkins indicates that the status the medical profession once enjoyed
in court is slipping.
Hold rigidly to the rules in granting summary judgments and in
directing verdicts.18 ' Although a judge may honestly feel that he is
subserving justice in shielding doctors from jury speculation, the feeling of injustice arising from numerous judicial invasions of the jury's
10
In an AMA survey, 30 out of 41 medical society executives thought that a
malpractice suit had little or no effect on a doctor's reputation or practice; 32
out of 38 thought the effect, if any, was "not at all lengthy, a matter of months or
weeks." 164 A.M.AJ. 580-82 (1957).
loGaymon v. Quinn Menhaden Fisheries, 108 So.2d 641, 644 (lst D.C.A. Fla.
1959). The Court stated: "Public policy requires that our courts be ever vigilant in
making summary disposition of causes lest the application of the rule result in
eroding or destroying the fundamental rights of litigants . . . to have the issues
.. tried by a jury of fellow citizens." See also Tennant v. Peoria and P.U. Ry.,
321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944).
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province may, in time, increase lay resentment to the point where
an unbiased jury verdict will be difficult to obtain.162 The cry in
some quarters that this point has already been reached does not seem
to apply to the country generally. The evidence in Florida suggests
1
that, up to now, juries have been inclined to give the doctor a break. 3
In sum, it would not be stating the matter too simply to say that,
during the last century, society surrendered a segment of its judicial
function to a professional group; that in many cases the medical witness came to occupy a quasi-judicial position; that the judiciary, consciously or unconsciously, altered the substantive law of negligence to
grant a favored position to the medical profession in courts of law; and
that the medical profession saw fit to abuse this unique privilege.
Change is on the way. The scales of justice slowly swing. The
Tyranny of the Expert is disappearing. Lay witnesses are placed at
par with learned experts. Jurors can infer negligence from circumstances in the teeth of contrary expert testimony. The quantum of
proof has been re-established as a matter of probability. The locality
rule diminishes. In short, the first steps to recall malpractice to the
fold of negligence law have been taken in Montgomery v. Stary, Smith
v. Dohr and Atkins v. Humes. Others must follow until the doctor
once again stands on an equal footing with other skilled artisans.

16 21nterview with Belli, A Way to Stop Most Malpractice Suits, Medical Economics, March 16, 1959, p. 75.

1631n Dade, Broward and Palm Beach counties, 17 of the 19 jury verdicts have
been for defendant. See Appendix, Table II. See also Stetler, The History of
Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30 TEmp. L.Q. 366, 375

(1957),

wherein it is pointed out that in 522 appellate cases concluded, jury trial in 233
resulted in verdict for defendant in almost 44%.
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
FLORIDA APPELLATE CASES*
To April 1, 1959
FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF-PATIENT
Verdict for PlaintiffAffirmed
Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936). Death from chiropractic
adjustment. The first trial in 1932 resulted in judgment for plaintiff for $5,000.
On appeal the judgment was reversed, then on rehearing affirmed. 113 Fla. 600,
152 So. 667 (1933). On a second rehearing the Court announced an equal division
of the Court and reinstated the judgment of reversal requiring a new trial. 119 Fla.
49, 160 So. 490 (1934). Retrial resulted in judgment for $10,670, which was
affirmed, as cited.
Baldor v. Rogers, 81 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1954). Koch treatment for cancer.
Montgomery v. Stary, 84 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1955). Loss of baby's fingers by hot
towels.
Verdict for Doctor Reversed
Smith v. Zeagler, 116 Fla. 628, 157 So. 328 (1934). Sponge left in body; negligence per se.
Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 188 So. 815 (1939). Glaucoma. Neglect.
Stauf v. Holden, 94 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1957). Appendectomy. Reversed on improper
charge only. Settled before retrial.
Atkins v. Humes, 107 So.2d (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958) (summary judgment for doctor
aff'd), rev'd, 110 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1959). Volkmann's contracture from bad cast.
FAVORAB.E To DEFENDANT-DocrOR
Summary Judgment or Directed Verdict Affirmed
Grubbs v. McShane, 144 Fla. 585, 198 So. 208 (1940). Diathermy for phlebitis;
burns.
Hill v. Boughton, 146 Fla. 505, 1 So.2d 510 (1941). False diagnosis of tuberculosis. Remanded with leave to amend declaration. New suit (Dade No. 18,187)
dismissed 1944 for want of prosecution.
Hudson v. Weiland, 150 Fla. 523, 8 So.2d 37 (1942). Burns from diathermy.
Horowitz v. Schwartz, 74 So.2d 801 (1954). Transected colon during appendectomy.
Hine v. Fox, 89 So.2d 13 (1956). Burns from broken cautery instrument.
Reid v. Groom, 101 So.2d 22 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). Lint in eye after surgery.
(This information secured from trial court record).
Crovella v. Cochrane, 102 So.2d 307 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1958). Failure to diagnose
pregnancy.
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Jury Verdict for Defendant Affirmed

Stewart v. Estes, 153 Fla. 744, 15 So.2d 679
authorized circumsion.

(1943).

Bad appendectomy;

un-

Different Rulings As to Several Defendants
Dorn v. Smith, 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958). False teeth lodged in bronchia during
anesthesia. Directed verdict for surgeon and hospital affirmed. Directed verdict for
anesthetist reversed.
*Omitted are Palmer v. Jackson, 62 Fla. 249, 57 So. 240 (1911); Slaughter v. Tyler, 126
Fla. 515, 171 So. 320 (1936); Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So.2d 70, cert. denied, 104 So.2d 592
(Fla. 1958) (rulings in all three involve the statute of limitations only); Chambers v. Nottebaum,
96 So.2d 716 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1957); Zaretsky v. Jacobson, 99 So.2d 730 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958)
(both ruled on unauthorized treatment- technical trespass- only).
TABLE I
STATISTICAL SURVEY OF MALPRACTICE CASES IN DADE, BROWARD

AND PALM BEACH COUNTIES
(Covering approximately 1400 doctors,* including osteopaths, listed in 1959 telephone directories and including all suits filed before April 1, 1959)
Abandoned
19
Settled
25
Tried
Judicial disposition
33 (63.5%)
Jury verdict
19 (36.5%)
52
Pending

17

Total number of malpractice cases"
Dade

Broward

4

Palm Beach

113
Total

Per cent

Result favorable to
plaintiff-patient
Settlement
Jury verdict

17
1

18

5
1

46

1
2
5
3

6

3
0

11

2
0
5
5

3

25
2

12

23
10
17
19

27

26
2.07 28 plus

69

24
10.4
17.7
19.7

Result favorable to
defendant-doctor
Summary
judgment
Directed verdict
Jury verdict
Abandoned
Concluded cases
Pending cases
Totals all cases

20
8
7
11
-

647

17
7

15
3

71

24

18

-

96

72 minus

-

17
113

*There were 4,756 licensed doctors in Florida as of Feb. 1959.
".This figure is believed to represent at least 90% of the actual total. The possible sources
of error are (1) the fallibility of the human eye in searching indexes and (2) the fact that no
account was taken of doctors who had retired, or moved out of the area, or died before 1959.
This latter source of error is probably not great; there were relatively few malpractice suits
before World War II.
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TABLE I1
MALPRACTICE Surrs FILED IN DADE, BROWARD AND PALM BEACH
COUNTIES BY FIVE-YE
PERIODS

1921-25
2

1926-30
3

1931-35
3

1936-40
4

1941-45
3

1946-50
18

1951-55
40

1956-580
38

*This 3-year figure projected would give 63 suits for a 5-year period, an increase but little
larger than the present rate of population growth in the area.
POPULATION OF DADE, BROWARD AND PALM BEACH COUNTIES

1940"
387,522

1950"
693,705

195500
1,029,895

The three counties contain approximately 30% of the population of Florida and
constitute the largest urban area in the state. They are often called the Gold Coast.
*U. S. Census.
"*MoRas, FLORIDA HAMOOE (1957).

A comparison of the tables above shows that the proportion of malpractice suits
to population, even in an area where social flux has been extremely great, has increased substantially but not alarmingly. The problem can be viewed somewhat
more coolly than is today popular if it is noted that there was one malpractice
suit per year for approximately every 170,000 people in the period 1946-50, 108,000
in the period 1951-55, and 91,000 in the period 1956-58.
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